Quantum oblivious transfer (QOT) is an essential cryptographic primitive. But unconditionally secure QOT is known to be impossible. Here we propose a practical QOT protocol, which is perfectly secure against dishonest sender without relying on any technological assumption. Meanwhile, it is also secure against dishonest receiver in the absence of long-term quantum memory and complicated collective measurements. The protocol is extremely feasible, as it can be implemented using currently available Mach-Zehnder interferometer, and no quantum memory, collective measurements nor entanglement are needed for honest participants. More importantly, comparing with other practical QOT schemes, our protocol has an unbeatable efficiency since it requires the transmission of a single photon only.
I. INTRODUCTION
Oblivious transfer (OT) is an important concept in cryptography, with many variations. The original version, a.k.a. all-or-nothing OT, was introduced by Rabin in 1981 [1] . Shortly after, Even, Goldreich and Lempel proposed 1-out-of-2 OT [2] . Later it was proven that OT is an essential building block for two-party and multiparty protocols [3] . Unfortunately, unconditionally secure OT (whose security is guaranteed solely by the fundamental laws of physics) was proven impossible [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . Even OT built-upon secure relativistic bit commitment [11] [12] [13] [14] is covered too [15] .
To circumvent the problem, many practically secure quantum OT (QOT) were proposed, whose security relies on the assumption that the adversary is limited to some technological constraints, e.g., noisy quantum storage (where the quantum memory is subjected to a certain level of imperfection) [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] or bounded quantum storage (where the amount of quantum data that can be stored is limited by some constants) [24, 25] . But to transfer a single classical bit obliviously, these protocols have to involve the transmission of thousands of qubits to reach a satisfactory level of security. Consequently, if they are used for building more complicated multi-party secure computation protocols [3] which may call for many rounds of QOT, then the total number of transmitted qubits will be tremendous, making the resultant protocols lose the sense of being "practical".
Here we will propose a QOT protocol, in which only the transmission of a single photon is required. For dishonest sender, our protocol is not only unconditionally secure (i.e., the cheating probability can be made arbitrarily close to 0 as long as the fundamental laws of physics hold), but also perfectly secure (the sender's cheating probability equal to 0 exactly). Meanwhile, it is practically secure against dishonest receiver as long as he does * Electronic address: hegp@mail.sysu.edu.cn not have long-term quantum memory and cannot perform complicated collective measurements.
Such a requirement on quantum memory is much the same to the above noisy-storage model, except that we explicitly require that the imperfection of the storage devices should reach the extent that after a certain period of time, the final state in the quantum memory should no longer contain any information about the original state that it initially stored. This can easily be met nowadays, because in practice, due to the unavoidable noise from the environment, no quantum memory can store a quantum state free from error forever. With the help of quantum correction code, the lifetime of the state can be extended. But implementing quantum correction code is still hard for currently available technology. Thus our protocol will be useful today and in the foreseen future.
II. DEFINITIONS
We will focus only on all-or-nothing OT below, so we simply call it OT. As defined in [3] , OT is a cryptographic task between sender Alice and receiver Bob, with the following properties. (III) Bob knows which of these two events actually occurred.
(IV) Alice learns nothing about whether Bob got b or not.
From these definitions we can see that the goal of dishonest Alice is to learn what happens at Bob's side, while dishonest Bob wants to increase his probability of getting b. Let P probability 1/2, i.e., there is P * Alice = 1/2 even in the honest case. Thus, Alice's successful cheating probability v should be defined as
Note that forcing Alice to commit to a specific value of b is not the duty of OT. If she conceives the value of b in her mind while her actual actions in the protocol lead Bob to another irrelevant bitb, then we should takeb as the actual b value that Alice inputs to the protocol instead. This should not be considered as cheating, as long as it does not increase Alice's probability v on knowing whether Bob got b or not.
When studying Bob's cheating, we should note that Bob can choose to either get b unambiguously (i.e., he knows with certainty whether the value he got is correct or not) or ambiguously (i.e., his obtained value matches b with a considerable probability, but he does not known exactly whether it is correct or not). Let b ′ denote what Bob obtained from the protocol, we can define the reliability R of b ′ as the probability for b ′ = b. When Bob gets b ambiguously (unambiguously), there is R < 100% (R = 100%).
Let P * Bob denote the probability that Bob gets b with reliability R = 100%. Then the goal of secure OT is to ensure P * Bob = 1/2. Therefore, it is natural to define Bob's successful cheating probability u as
Nevertheless, when Bob knows unambiguously that he fails to get b, he can still make a guess, which can be correct with probability 1/2, i.e., R = 50%. Thus we should note that the average reliability that Bob obtains in secure OT is not required to be equal to 1/2. Instead, it should beR
III. OUR PROTOCOL
As mentioned in the introduction, in practice any quantum memory has a limited storage time. Let T denote the upperbound of the storage time of state-of-theart quantum memory (even when quantum correction is taken into account), such that after time T , we can be sure that it is no longer possible to gain any information of the state initially stored in the memory. With this consideration, we propose a practical QOT protocol, whose experimental apparatus is illustrated in Fig.1 . Let τ A (τ B ) denote the delay time that Alice (Bob) introduced using OD A (OD B ), and θ A (θ B ) be the phase shift angle produced by P S A (P S B ). For simplicity, suppose that except for OD A and OD B , the time for the photon to travel through all other devices in Fig.1 is negligible. Our protocol is as follows.
Protocol QOT: (for transferring a bit b ∈ {0, 1} from Alice to Bob) (i) Alice and Bob agree on the times t 1 and t 2 which mark the beginning and the end of the transmission, and a fixed delay time value ∆ ≪ t 2 − t 1 .
(ii) Bob randomly picks the delay time τ B ∈ {0, ∆} and the phase shift angle θ B ∈ {0, π}, and sets the optical delay OD B and the phase shifter P S B accordingly. He keeps them in these settings during the entire time
(iii) Alice picks the delay time τ A ∈ {0, ∆} randomly, and takes the phase shift angle
where b ∈ {0, 1} is the secret bit that she wants to transfer, then sets OD A and P S A accordingly. She also picks a secret time t s ∈ [t 1 , t 2 −∆] randomly, and sends a photon from the source S at t s .
(iv) When Bob finds his detector D i (i ∈ {0, 1}) clicks, he records the index i. Note that if he detects more than one click or no click at all within [t 1 , t 2 ], he should conclude that Alice cheats. 
IV. CORRECTNESS
Correctness means that if both parties are honest, then the goal of OT can be reached. In our protocol, when using the second quantization formalism, we can use |t A |0 B to denote that there is a photon on path A at time t and no photon on path B, and use |0 A |t B to denote that there is a photon on path B at time t and no photon on path A. Then the initial state of Alice's photon after passing BS A is
After passing OD A , P S A , OD B and P S B , the final state of the photon arriving at BS B is Alice sends a single photon from the source S to the beam splitter BSA, which is a half-silvered mirror that will either reflect the photon into path A or transmit it into path B with equal probabilities. On path A (B), the photon is reflected by the mirror MA (MB) so that it is redirected to another half-reflected and half-transmitted beam splitter BSB after passing the optical delay ODA (ODB ) and the phase shifter P SA (P SB), then reaches either the detector D0 or D1. When ODA and ODB are set to produce the same delay time, the total length of paths A and B are equal, so that the complete apparatus acts as a balanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer.
and
respectively, where
Since τ A , τ B ∈ {0, ∆}, with probability 1/2 there is τ A = τ B . Then if θ A = θ B , Eq. (7) becomes
, (12) so that the photon will be detected by D 0 at time t s + τ A with certainty. Or if |θ A − θ B | = π, then
, (13) so that the photon will be detected by D 1 at time t s + τ A with certainty. That is, in either case the detector D i will click, where
Combining with Eq.(4), we can see that the value of b that Bob obtained from Eq. (5) is correct.
On the other hand, with probability 1/2 there will be τ A = τ B . Then Eq. (7) indicates that the state of the photon arrived at BS B at time t s + τ A (or t s + τ B ) has the form |t s + τ A A |0 B (or |0 A |t s + τ B B ). Applying Eqs. (8) and (9) on them, we know that D 0 and D 1 could click with equal probabilities at either time t s + τ A or t s + τ B . Therefore, unlike Eq. (14), now the index i of the detector D i that clicks contains no information on the relationship between θ A and θ B , so that Bob fails to get b.
Thus we proved that when both parties are honest, our protocol can ensure that with probability 1/2, Bob can get b with reliability R = 100%.
V. SECURITY AGAINST ALICE
The goal of dishonest Alice is to know whether Bob got b or not. According to step(v), Bob got b (failed to get b) if τ A = τ B (τ A = τ B ). Thus, Alice needs to know Bob's choice of τ B . But a distinct feature of our protocol is: there is only one-way information transfer from Alice to Bob, while Bob never announces any classical information or transfers any quantum information to Alice. Thus it is clear that Alice has no method to learn what happens at Bob's side. All that she can do is to make a random guess, which can be correct with probability P * Alice = 1/2. Thus her successful cheating probability is exactly
Therefore, our protocol is perfectly secure against dishonest Alice, without relying on any technological assumption.
VI. SECURITY AGAINST BOB
In principle, if Bob can store the photon unmeasured until Alice announces τ A , then he can always choose τ A = τ B and learn b with probability 100%. Thus our protocol is not unconditionally secure. But in practice, as we assumed that the maximum storage time of the state of the photon is T , Bob has to complete the measurement no later then t 2 + T . At that time Alice has not announces τ A yet. This forces Bob to make his own choice of τ B without knowing τ A . Consequently, it guarantees that τ A = τ B occurs with probability 1/2. When this indeed occurs, Bob gets b with reliability R = 100%. Else if τ A = τ B occurs, Bob knows that he fails to get b. Thus the probability that Bob gets b with reliability R = 100% is P * Bob = 1/2, i.e., his cheating probability is
so that our protocol meets the requirement of OT in practice. However, there is still a security problem to worry. Let ρ 0 and ρ 1 denote the density matrices of the unmeasured state of the photon entering Bob's site (before passing OD B and P S B ) corresponding to Alice's choices b = 0 and b = 1, respectively. As elaborated in the appendix, they can be written as
where we treat the time interval [t 1 , t 2 ] as n equally divided time slots, i.e., t s can be chosen as t 1 , t 2 , ..., t n , with n → ∞. Then numerical calculation shows that the trace distance between ρ 0 and ρ 1 for high n is
According to Theorem 9.1 of [26] , this indicates that there could be a positive-operator valued measure (POVM) for Bob, which can discriminate ρ 0 and ρ 1 (and thus learn b) unambiguously with probability
or can discriminate ρ 0 and ρ 1 ambiguously so that Bob get b with the average reliabilitȳ
Consequently, if Bob can apply this POVM, he can cheat with probability
or obtain b with an average reliabilitȳ R ≃ 81.9% > 75% (23) so that our protocol is not a secure OT in principle. Nevertheless, currently it is unknown whether such a POVM can be implemented with currently available technology or not. Especially, Eqs. (17) and (18) show that ρ 0 and ρ 1 contain the states from different time t s where s = 1, 2, ..., n with n → ∞. Thus the POVM for discriminating ρ 0 and ρ 1 is actually a collective measurement on an infinite number of states potentially being sent at different time t s . Also, in practice the error rate of quantum memory increases with time. Then the actual density matrices ρ 0 and ρ 1 will then turn into the mixes of quantum states containing different amount of error. It makes the POVM for decoding the correct b become even more complicated. Therefore, before these difficulties could be overcome in the future, our protocol can be trusted as a secure OT in practice.
VII. DISCUSSIONS
In summary, we propose an OT protocol, which is perfectly secure against dishonest Alice, i.e., her probability on learning whether Bob got b or not is exactly zero. Meanwhile, it is practically secure against dishonest Bob, i.e., his probability for getting b with reliability 100% is exactly 1/2 as long as he does not have long-term quantum memory nor the POVM for maximally discriminating ρ 0 and ρ 1 in Eqs. (17) and (18) without knowing Alice's delay time τ A .
On the feasibility aspect, by comparing our Fig.1 and that of [27] , we can see that the technology in [27] is sufficient for implementing our protocol. Also, honest participants do not need quantum memory, collective measurements nor entanglement. Thus it is very feasible. Comparing with other practical OT protocols using noisy or bounded storage [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] , our protocol only needs the transmission of a single photon. Thus the efficiency is unbeatable.
In the above analysis, we have not considered the transmission and detection errors in practice. But since only one photon is used in our protocol, it is obvious that the error rate of the final transferred bit b is determined directly by the error rate in transmission and detection, which can easily be checked in practice.
Appendix: The density matrices and trace distance
Here we calculate the density matrices ρ 0 , ρ 1 and trace distance D(ρ 0 , ρ 1 ) used in the security proof of our protocol against dishonest Bob.
After passing OD A and P S A , the state of the photon that Alice sent to Bob (i.e., |ψ in in Eq.(6)) turns into
That is, if b = 0, then
or if b = 1, then
Let us treat the time interval [t 1 , t 2 ] as n equally divided time slots with n → ∞, i.e., t s can be chosen as t 1 , t 2 , ..., t n . Since τ A can be either 0 or ∆ with equal probabilities, the density matrices corresponding to b = 0 and b = 1, respectively, are
thus Eqs. (17) and (18) in the main text are obtained. Now let us calculate the trace distance between them. The above equations give
Denote
for s = 1, ..., n, and take ∆ = 1 for simplicity, then
(|s s + n| + |s + n s|)
(|s + 1 s + n| + |s + n s + 1|)).
For s = 1, ..., 2n, denote
i.e., only the sth element of the vector at the right-hand side of the equation is 1, while the rest elements are all 0. Then
where [1 i,j ] denote a 2n × 2n matrix whose elements are all 0 except that the element in the i row and j column is 1. Therefore 
FIG. 2:
The trace distance between the density matrice ρ0 and ρ1 in Eqs. (17) and (18) 
The trace distance between ρ 0 and ρ 1 is defined as
Numerical calculation shows that it drops as n increases, but slows down significantly when n > 50, as shown in Fig.2 . We calculated up to n = 1000, and the result is
